“I cannot agree with those who rank modesty among the virtues. To the logician all things should be seen exactly as they are, and to underestimate one’s self is as much a departure from truth as to exaggerate one’s own powers.”
Sherlock Holmes, Arthur Conan Doyle
By Holmes’ reasoning, you wouldn’t rank modesty, which is, after all, a deviation from the truth, among the virtues. So is arrogance, for that matter, only in the opposite direction. I wonder though, is arrogance a vice? Is modesty a virtue?
Why is modesty counted amongst the virtues? Certainly not for reasons of fidelity, for it neglects truth. In fact, its virtue seems to stem from this lack of faithfulness to reality; the more impressive a person, and the better they manage to appear unconscious of it, the more laudable their modesty. One who is mediocre at anything is usually modest for their own sake; to not be modest when you have much to be modest about is to be delusional. In its defence, however, perhaps modesty needn’t demand deviating from, or even concealing truth, but simply shunning undue importance or stress on it.
Arrogance, on the other hand, is defined as a display of superiority or feeling of self-importance, one that is overbearing or unpleasant or offensive. With such a loaded definition, it certainly sounds like a vice. But, if it’s not offensive or overbearing or unpleasant, is it still bad? That is to ask, is a display of superiority bad in itself?
Before you can answer that, I think, it helps to ask the question – is it accurate, the display of superiority? If a professional singer or athlete displays a sense of superiority in their field when they interact with me, are they really wrong? I doubt one can argue they’re wrong in their assessment of our respective abilities; one might, however, try to argue they’re wrong in their behaviour in light of that fact. Even there, though, the matter is hardly straightforward. If their talent is indeed greater, why must they strive to ignore the fact under a veneer of modesty? What’s the harm in acknowledging what is true, and what’s good about pretending that what is true is not so, or in trying to conceal it? One can always acknowledge something without being unpleasant about it, which is to say a display of superiority need not necessarily be offensive.
Then you can question what ‘superiority’ means. Superiority, after all, is a relative term, it doesn’t imply an absolute assessment of something or someone. Put simply, saying that X is superior to Y doesn’t imply that Y is ”bad’ or pathetic or low quality; it just means that X is better than Y. One could say that the world number 1 (in anything) is superior to the world number 2 without raising eyebrows; saying that the world number 2 sucks, however, is almost certainly deluded.
This relates to arrogance when you ask what, exactly, is condemnable about arrogance? Is it the fact that a person thinks they are better than others? Or is the problem that they think poorly of others? The two are quite different, even if easily confused – one can, after all, consider themselves superior in any aspect without considering others low – even, in fact, retaining a high opinion of them, albeit one still higher of oneself.
If considering oneself or anyone better or worse than another in any dimension is objectionable, however, then, since everyone certainly isn’t equal at everything, falsehood becomes a virtue – a conclusion that leads me to reject the idea that merely thinking oneself better at something than another is abominable. One is left with the other argument – that the objection to arrogance is the poor opinion of another. That, however, even if valid – and this too is doubtful (if I am a terrible painter, then I don’t think anyone can be at fault for having a poor opinion of my painting abilities) – is inaccurate. For arrogance, as I mentioned before, needn’t imply a poor opinion, only one lower than oneself (albeit possibly still high).
The logician’s objection to arrogance (and modesty) is its overestimation which is a deviation from truth. An arrogance based on an accurate assessment of oneself and others, therefore, answers this charge. The objection to arrogance that arises from etiquette or emotion, I think, is that it carries contempt for others. But superiority need not imply disdain, a relationship of superiority can exist between two people with a good (albeit unequal) opinion of each other.
In the best of cases then, arrogance can be true (one really is better in the dimension under consideration), and inoffensive in that it needn’t imply a low opinion of others. Is this, then, acceptable? It satisfies the requirement of logic that it be accurate because the superiority is genuine, and the logic of etiquette or emotion that it not harbour disdain for others.
Perhaps it comes down to whether one values truth more, or feelings. If feelings matter more, then arrogance, even if accurate, and even if respectful, is objectionable simply because it punctures the charade that differences of abilities must be papered over, and treated as though they don’t exist. Modesty, on the other hand, though typically condemned by truth, is pampered by emotion, and not surprisingly has a much better reputation.
If truth does justify – or at least excuse – arrogance to an extent, it also takes the sheen off modesty. Anyone can be modest when they have much to be modest about; in the presence of those who are better than oneself in whatever dimension, immodesty is delusional. If, on grounds of logic, arrogance is somewhat excusable when it’s based on truth, then perhaps, on grounds of etiquette, modesty is somewhat laudable when it’s based on falsity, or at least on ignoring reality.